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In racial identification, certain known characteristics about a person, usually visible, morphological ones, 
are picked out and taken to signify the presence of other characteristics which are unknown or not visible 
and which mark a person as similar to or different from a particular set of people. Race, used in this way, 
often produces negative, discriminatory behavior where group identities are placed in relation to each 
other in the form of a hierarchy. This paper aims to synthesize Linda Alcoff’s descriptive accounts of 
race as an extant ontological category and of social identity as a location within a complex network of 
identifications with Anthony Appiah’s criticism of racialism and Sally Haslanger’s ameliorative 
definition of racialized identities to show that race, as it stands, is a reductively misrepresentative way of 
ascribing identity. By dismantling race as a concept in use we will better understand the actual 








On a descriptive account, race is a social type of group identity within which one places 
oneself or is placed by others. In racial identification, certain known characteristics 
about a person, usually visible, morphological ones having to do with skin color, hair 
texture, bone structure, etc., are picked out and taken to signify the presence of other 
characteristics which are unknown or not visible and which mark a person as similar to 
or different from a particular set of people. Race, used in this way, has significant 
effects on social behavior, and this behavior often becomes negative and breeds 
discrimination when group identities are placed in relation to each other in the form of a 
hierarchy. In this paper, I aim to synthesize Linda Alcoff’s descriptive accounts of race 
as an extant ontological category and of social identity as a location within a complex 
network of identifications with Anthony Appiah’s criticism of racialism and Sally 
Haslanger’s ameliorative definition of racialized identities to show that race, as it 
stands, is a reductively misrepresentative way of ascribing identity. By dismantling race 
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as a concept in use we will better understand the actual complexity of social identity, 
and we will cultivate more justice in social relations. 
 
In order to dismantle race and to see the benefits of dismantling it, we need to start 
from an understanding of the way race works in the given world, but before we can 
understand how race as a social identity works, we must understand the way social 
identification works in general. Particular identities gain their content through relations 
of difference with other identities in a social network of relations. As Alcoff puts it, 
identity is “a location within a social structure and marked vis-à-vis other locations 
which gives the identity its specificity and internal characteristics” (41). The identity is 
the point at which someone locates oneself in the system or is located by others. Both 
self-identification and other-identification work through the mechanism of difference 
and similarity. For instance, when I identify myself as a young, white, middle-class, 
American male, I am claiming to possess these characteristics which are similar to 
certain characteristics presumably possessed by others—i.e. youngness, whiteness, 
middle-class-ness, American-ness, and maleness. Additionally, these basic parts of my 
identity (and this is by no means an exhaustive list) only contain substance beyond the 
empty sounds of words because of their relations to not only each other, but also to all 
of the things I consider myself to not be. I am American because I am not Canadian or 
Mexican or a citizen of any other country in the world, and my identification as an 
American immediately places me in relation, at least on one level, to all other 
Americans and to the citizens of other countries through similarity or, perhaps 
especially, through difference. Social identities are also inherently discursive, meaning 
they are contingent upon the way we use words. Identities spring out of our social 
process of naming things, wherein we draw lines between objects and people by 
applying a signifier to them. American-ness would have no meaning had we not 
decided to name something a “country,” to divide up the world along political and 
geographic boundaries. “Young” would have no meaning had we never decided to 
count the years someone lived and to compare the number to the number of years 
someone else lived. Race is a type of social identity, and so it works through the 
mechanism of similarity and difference and is inherently discursive. 
 
Race, as it is popularly used today, is a particular type of social identity which works on 
a visual level and generally has to do with bodily morphological differences. As we 
venture through the world we notice differences in skin color, bone structure, hair 
texture, height, and build between people, and we notice that some people look more 
similar to ourselves or different from ourselves than others. Admittedly, this is a 
simplified story—many of our race categories are socially inherited long before we see 
the people that fill them, but without the visual component, race would either not exist 
or have very a different meaning from the way it is used in our society. The visual 
differences take on special importance in race because of the way they are presumed to 
signify other differences. In racial identification, as Alcoff says, the visible difference 
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one notices is taken to be “the ‘sign’ of deeper, more fundamental difference, a 
difference in behavioral disposition, in moral and rational capacity, or in cultural 
achievement” (31). Inevitably, we place these signs in a relation of difference to 
ourselves. I would only take black skin to signify something which is not true of me 
because I do not have black skin; it would be irrational to say that white skin 
necessarily signifies something which I know not to be true of myself, being one who 
has white skin. However, deeper still than the formal differences or similarities in 
signified facts between racial signs, I also place myself in relation to my own race and 
other races through feelings of solidarity and connectedness. At one point, Alcoff 
describes racial identity as “a differentiation or distribution of felt connectedness to 
others” (43). She goes on to say, “The felt connectedness to visibly similar others may 
produce either flight or empathic identification or possible dispositions” (43). We 
respond on a deep, emotional, personal level to the differences and similarities we feel 
in racial identification, and it is likely that these dispositional responses contribute to 
racism in society, perhaps especially in cases of implicit bias where racist behavior 
comes out of an unconscious response to difference. 
 
Races, though socially quite salient, develop out of our discursive process of applying 
names (i.e. signifiers) to sets of people and are therefore not transcendent a priori facts 
about the world. None of the significations created in race are inherent to the visible 
characteristics picked out: skin color, in itself, has no direct tie to moral capacity, but 
the traits these visible characteristics have come to signify have been attached to the 
visible signifiers socially. The racial sign, as an attached composite of signifier (i.e. 
visible characteristic) and signified (i.e. moral or rational capacity, cultural 
achievement, etc.) is a social construction. This conception of race as socially 
constructed goes against accounts which take race to be biologically real, accounts 
which Anthony Appiah calls “racialist” and criticizes in his essay “Illusions of Race.” 
As he describes it, racialism is “committed not just to the view that there are heritable 
characteristics, which constitute ‘a sort of racial essence,’ but also to the claim that the 
essential heritable characteristics account for more than the visible morphology—skin 
color, hair type, facial features—on the basis of which we make our informal 
classifications” (37). He and Alcoff both show that the science does not back up such a 
biologically essentialist account. As Alcoff puts it, “[T]here is a newly emerging 
scientific consensus that race is a myth, that the term corresponds to no significant 
biological category, and that no existing racial classifications correlate in useful ways to 
gene frequencies, clinal variations or any significant human biological difference” (31). 
Appiah takes this point to show that race is an illusion, as his essay title suggests. He 
says, “The truth is that there are no races: there is nothing in the world that can do all 
we ask race to do for us” (45). Appiah seems to assume that either race involves clear 
biological distinctions between broad sets of people or it does not exist at all, and while 
we would be right to agree that biological essentialism fails, to say that races then do 
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not exist would be to seriously underestimate the social implications that concepts of 
race have produced. 
 
As Alcoff argues—against Appiah’s conclusion—that races are not biologically real 
does not mean that they are not socially real. She argues that races are socially 
constructed ontological categories which are not necessarily transcendent natural kinds 
but are within history and culturally various (33). To say that races, because socially 
constructed and dependent on culture, can therefore be dispensed with immediately 
would be to seriously underestimate the salience of race as a category and its impact in 
the world today. Alcoff summarizes the problem quite eloquently: 
 
“[I]n the very midst of our contemporary skepticism toward race stands the 
compelling social reality that race, or racialised identities, have as much 
political, sociological and economic salience as they ever had. Race tends 
toward opening up or shutting down job prospects, career possibilities, available 
places to live, potential friends and lovers, reactions from police, credence from 
jurors and presumptions by one’s students. Race may not correlate with clinal 
variations, but it persistently correlates with statistically overwhelming 
significance in wage levels, unemployment levels, poverty levels and the 
likelihood of incarceration” (31). 
 
Clearly, race significantly effects social behavior in a broad scope, so while we can 
rightfully say that race is a socially-constructed reality, it is a reality nonetheless—one 
which we must accurately account for in order to change. 
 
Race produces important effects on social behavior, and many of the negative effects 
stem from race’s nature as a poor way of identifying people and providing accurate 
information about them. For one thing, it takes different morphological characteristics 
like skin color and bone structure to signify differences in “temperament, belief, and 
intention” as Appiah puts it (45). This is a problem, first, because the particular 
temperaments or beliefs race labels are presumed to signify may not actually be 
present in people possessing the morphological characteristics connected to the race 
label. This becomes especially clear in racial stereotyping. For instance, take the 
stereotypes that Asians are good at math or that African-Americans are lazy. The 
race-labels “Asian” or “African-American” are applied to people because of the 
visible characteristics they possess which have been attached to the labels, 
characteristics such as narrow eyes or black skin, respectively. However, not all 
people with narrow eyes are especially skilled at math, and many people with black 
skin are not lazy. These morphological characteristics have no direct connection to 
the traits they are taken to signify. In this way, race itself acts as a subtle version of 
stereotyping when it takes morphology to signify anything more than bare 
morphology, and it misrepresents the actual characteristics a person possesses by 
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attaching to them those characteristics presumed by their “race.” This 
misrepresentation of identity due to race also happens when someone self-identifies 
as a particular race. When I call myself Caucasian, I am placing myself in a relation 
of similarity to other people I would call Caucasian. If I take “Caucasian” to signify 
anything other than morphological traits, other things which I take to be true of 
myself and so attach them to my race, I could very well be misrepresenting the others 
to whom I am claiming similarity by using the same race label. 
 
A second problem arises in that when race is used to mark a person’s identity, it can 
tend to eclipse other important aspects of her identity such as her class, age, or sex if 
race is applied in isolation from the others. As explained earlier, social identity 
expresses a location within an intricate network of intersecting identifications that relate 
to each other through similarity or difference. A person therefore cannot accurately 
identify herself by only her race, because her race only charts one line of relation with 
other people. This problem of accurate identification can be generally benign, but it 
becomes important in certain cases where we wish to get at the root of particular 
injustices regarding social identity by determining the identity locations where they 
actually occur. For instance, we might think it a worthy project to counteract hiring 
disparities in the corporate world by instituting affirmative action policies. Perhaps we 
notice a statistically disproportionate number both of Caucasians getting hired 
compared to African-Americans and of men getting hired compared to women, and so 
we institute affirmative action quotas for the hiring of women and of African-
Americans. Here we have considered two relations of those not getting hired to those 
getting hired more often, namely race and gender. These affirmative action policies 
may be effective to a point, but it is possible that by looking at race and gender in 
isolation from each other we would have precluded the possibility of finding out if 
there is a significant hiring disparity between, say, Caucasian men and African-
American women which differs in proportion from the disparity between Caucasians 
and African-Americans and the disparity between men and women. Such a case shows 
the ways multiple identities can overlap and compound when targeted for 
discriminatory practices (even if the practices only occur because of implicit bias and 
not overt discrimination). Considering any aspect of identity in isolation from others 
can eclipse other significant aspects of identity. 
 
Race presents a special problem for determining the identities targeted for 
discrimination, because it already obscures possibly relevant relations of identity by 
subsuming several characteristics under one label. If we take race to signify multiple 
characteristics beyond morphology, as described above, it could be difficult to tell 
whether the root target of discrimination is the entire set of characteristics signified by 
the race label or only a single characteristic which is then projected onto the race as a 
whole. For example, imagine that a Caucasian gay person grows up in Uganda where 
he is bullied at his high school. He is a minority in the school both for being white and 
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for being gay. Now imagine that he moves to America and starts a business. Because of 
his terrible memories of being discriminated against by people with black skin, he does 
not hire people with black skin at his business. This case presents a couple problems, 
first because of the potential difficulties in determining whether the man was 
discriminated against in Uganda for being white or for being gay, even if the 
discrimination was explicitly homophobic. His whiteness could have made him stand 
out more as a target of discrimination than if he was only gay and not white; we cannot 
know because we cannot disentangle his race from his sexual orientation. They both 
inform his identity and are defined in relation to each other. Secondly, we can see how 
his discrimination against black Americans was actually rooted in his ill-feelings 
toward homophobic Ugandans but which were projected on those he considered to be 
of the same “race” as them. Here, we see how a race label could hypothetically act as a 
channel for discrimination where the discrimination might not have otherwise been 
applied. If there were no race label to connect Ugandans with black Americans, it 
would be clearer that the only connections between them are morphological traits, 
which in actuality have no connection to a person’s propensity to bully another person. 
Even the term “Ugandans” obscures the fact that it was only the particular people in the 
man’s high school who bullied him, and that they should not be taken to represent 
every black Ugandan person, let alone every black person. 
 
Race has become a salient dividing factor in the world, but this does not mean that race 
is a necessarily permanent fixture of society. Indeed, because of the way race 
misrepresents a person’s actual identity by attaching to them characteristics which they 
do not necessarily possess and because of the way a person’s “race” can be used as a 
target for discrimination, we would find significant benefits in dismantling race as a 
concept so that society may no longer use it. Racial labels and their signified content 
develop out of a historical narrative and are contingent upon a particular historical 
framework for their meaning. As Alcoff says, in her account race figures “not as a 
metaphysical necessity but as a necessity within a given historical context” (43). It is 
plausible to say, then, that were we to adjust the social consciousness on its way into 
future historical epochs, we might be able to remove the necessity of race’s existence as 
a marker of identity. As the American Civil Rights Movement has shown, changing the 
social consciousness regarding race is not only easier said than done but also not 
impossible to accomplish. 
 
In thinking about setting out on the project of removing “race” as a part of our social 
discourse, we might begin by redefining race in the way Sally Haslanger suggests in 
“Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?” In the 
paper, Haslanger puts forth an ameliorative definition of race with the intent not of 
mapping onto the way we use “race” now but rather with the intent of reducing 
injustice by changing the way we use racial identification. Haslanger agrees with Alcoff 
and Appiah that races are not genetically determined, and she also says that “in 
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different contexts racial distinctions are drawn on the basis of different characteristics,” 
meaning that races’ contents are historically and situationally contingent (43). She also 
agrees with Alcoff that a race, as a type of identity marker, “could be fruitfully 
understood as a position within a broad social network” (43). Bearing these things in 
mind, Haslanger says, “[R]ace is the social meaning of the geographically marked 
body, familiar markers being skin color, hair type, eye shape, physique” (44). She 
develops this account by defining race, or the concept of “racializing” a group, as the 
treatment of a person as subordinate or privileged because of “observed or imagined 
bodily features presumed to be evidence of ancestral links to a certain geographical 
region” (44). Haslanger’s redefinition of race makes the idea that race is used as a way 
of ordering people in a hierarchy inherent to its very definition, and furthermore makes 
clear that this ordering is only due to certain morphological features about a person. If 
we made this the predominant definition of race used in society, it would become 
impossible to ignore race’s negative effects—that race propagates social hierarchy 
based on features of a person’s body. Race would only explicitly apply in cases where 
it now works negatively, thus alerting us to the places that need justice. As more justice 
is produced, the need for “race” as a signifier will pass away. 
 
As this paper has shown, race is a socially-constructed dividing force in the social 
world today produces many negative effects on social behavior through its use as a 
signifier of identity. Furthermore, race is a poor signifier of identity, for one because it 
ascribes certain characteristics to a person which a person may not actually possess but 
which are presumptively signified by the race used to label the person due to other 
bodily features  they are known to possess. Race also obscures the more specific root 
targets and causes of discrimination while also providing a channel through which 
discrimination can target other people. In conclusion, we should aim as a society to 
change our public consciousness in such a way that it no longer needs race as a 
signifier. We should make clear the way race misrepresents the particularities of a 
person’s identity and the way race’s usage propagates social hierarchies of domination 
and discrimination. By making these things clear through the way we use race in public 
discourse, we will foster a public consciousness which no longer misidentifies people 







Alcoff, Linda Martin. “Philosophy and racial identity.” Web. 
 
Appiah, Kwame Anthony. “Illusions of Race.” In My Father’s House: Africa in the 
Philosophy of Culture. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 28-46. Web. 
Res Cogitans (2015) 6                                                                                                       Rockrohr | 152 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
 
Haslanger, Sally. “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To 
Be?” Noûs. Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2000. 31-55. Web. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.00201 
